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The Real truth
Stefano Baratella Domenico Zambella
Abstract
We study a real valued propositional logic with unbounded positive and negative
truth values that we call R-valued logic. Such a logic is semantically equivalent
to continuous propositional logic, with a different choice of connectives. After
presenting the deduction machinery and the semantics of R-valued logic, we
prove a completeness theorem for finite theories. Then we define unital and
Archimedean theories, in accordance with the theory of Riesz spaces. In the
unital setting, we prove the equivalence of consistency and satisfiability and
an approximated completeness theorem similar to the one that holds for con-
tinuous propositional logic. Eventually, among unital theories, we characterize
Archimedean theories as those for which strong completeness holds. We also
point out that R-valued logic provides alternative calculi for  Lukasiewicz logic
and for propositional continuous logic.
1 Introduction
Many-valued logics date back to the very early development of mathematical logic.
The real unit interval [0,1] has in particular been a favorite set of truth values.
Among [0,1]-valued logics,  Lukasiewicz logic occupies a predominant place (see e.g.
[Ha´j98]). Initially motivated by philosophical considerations and scientific curiosity,
 Lukasiewicz logic has received considerable attention by philosophers and computer
scientists working on fuzzy logics, approximate reasoning or other forms of non-
classical reasoning. On the algebraic side, the study of  Lukasiewicz logic led to
the notion of an MV-algebra. C.C. Chang first showed that MV-algebras provide a
complete semantics for  Lukasiewicz logic. See [Cha58], [Cha59].
Continuous logic makes its first appearence in [BYU10]. Its propositional fragment
extends  Lukasiewicz logic. See, for instance, the overview in [BYP10]. In spite of
appearing just an extension of  Lukasiewicz logic, continuous logic has an independent
origin and different motivations. Actually, it builds on a field of research, initiated
in the 1980’s by Henson and continued by a number of authors, on the model theory
of so called metric structures. Continuous logic provides a suitable logical setting for
dealing with structures like Banach spaces, Banach algebras, probability algebras,
etc. that arise in functional analysis or probability theory. See [BYBHU].
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As the origin of continuous logic lies in model theory, issues like developing deduc-
tion systems and studying their completeness have been somewhat postponed. A
completeness theorem for continuous predicate logic appears in [BYP10]. The au-
thors make use of results from [BY], where a completeness result for propositional
continuous logic is derived from the corresponding result for  Lukasiewicz logic.
Being [0,1]-valued, continuous logic apparently deals with bounded structures only.
Such a limitation can be overcome by allowing many-sorted structures, but the
many-sorted approach suffers from some drawbacks (see [BY08]). Those can only
be avoided by passing to a genuine logic for unbounded structures: one such logic
has been introduced in [BY08].
Strongly related to our work is an unbounded real valued logic that predates [BY08]
and has been introduced with different motivations. We refer to the abelian logic
of [MS89] (independently introduced in [Cas89]). In [MS89], the authors provide
a sound and complete axiomatization of abelian logic with respect to the class of
abelian l-groups (equivalently: with respect to the l-group of the reals). The con-
nections between abelian and  Lukasiewicz logic and calculi for both logics have been
studied in [MOG04]. Among other results, in [MOG04] the authors prove soundness
and completeness of a hypersequent calculus and of labelled and unlabelled sequent
calculi for abelian logic. They also establish the computational complexity of the
labelled calculus.
In this paper we develop a syntactic calculus in Hilbert style for a real-valued propo-
sitional logic, named R-valued logic. Our logic can be viewed as an extension of
abelian logic. As already mentioned, abelian logic is the logic of lattice-ordered
abelian groups, which has the reals among its characteristic models.
Ours is the logic of lattice-ordered vector spaces, also known as Riesz spaces (see
[AB85]). As proved in Section 5, R-valued logic has the reals among its characteristic
models (see, in particular, Remark 17 below). From the syntactic viewpoint, R-
valued logic comes equipped with scalar multiplication as an additional formation
rule for formulas. In this paper we restrict scalar multiplication to multiplication by
rationals in order not to rule the possibility of working with a countable language
(this might be useful in future developments). The results obtained in this paper
extend to multiplication by reals in a straightforward manner.
There is a natural overlapping of the results proved in this paper with those obtained
in [MS89], [MOG04] or, more in general, in the area of mathematical fuzzy logic
(see [AA.11a] and [AA.11b] for a comprehensive and up-to-date presentation of the
latter). Nevertheless the proof techniques used in the different contexts have their
own distinctive vein: algebraic (in this paper); logically-minded (in [MS89]) and
proof-theoretic (in [MOG04]). The different contexts in which abelian and R-valued
logic are developed may make a step-by-step translation of one logic into the other
not completely straightforward. We do not investigate that issue because we believe
that the strong connections between the two logics are witnessed, beyond any doubt,
by their respective completeness theorems.
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Yet we may say that some of the completeness results proved in this paper can be
regarded as extensions of those in [MS89] or in [MOG04], as they apply to a logic
more expressive than abelian logic.
A further reason why, in our opinion, R-valued logic is worth being investigated is
that it creates a link between the two independently developed areas of continuous
logic and of mathematical fuzzy logic.
We shall investigate a predicate extension of R-valued logic in a future work. As
already mentioned, a syntactic calculus for predicate continuous logic is presented in
[BYP10], while the semantics of unbounded continuous logic is introduced in [BY08].
From the latter it is evident that there is no straightforward interpretation of the
quantifiers in the unbounded case. Difficulties are also met on the abelian logic side.
Predicate extensions of abelian logic are very quickly sketched in [MS89, §X], where
the authors admit their conflicting ideas about the treatment of quantifiers. In any
case, ours remains a necessary step towards a possible predicate extension.
In the framework of R-valued logic we introduce a notion of theory and, under
suitable assumptions on theories, we prove different formulations of completeness
with respect to a semantics that we introduce in Section 2.
In Section 3 we introduce the syntactic calculus of R-valued logic, which turns out
to be quite different from the one introduced in [BYP10] and [BY]. Having in mind
the axiomatization of Riesz spaces (i.e. of lattice-ordered vector spaces, see [AB85]),
our logical axioms turn out to be quite natural. As for deduction rules, we show
that modus ponens alone does not suffice to get completeness. For this reason we
have to introduce two additional rules. Then we prove a number of properties of our
provability relation, including the correctness of a sort of cut rule, see Proposition 8.
It is a standard terminology to say that, in a given logic, strong completeness holds
for a set Σ of formulas if Σ ⊧ ϕ if and only if Σ ⊢ ϕ, for every formula ϕ. If the
previous property holds for all (finite) Σ, one says that (finite) strong completeness
holds for that logic. We recall that finite strong completeness holds for  Lukasiewicz
logic and for continuous propositional logic.
In Section 4 we prove finite strong completeness of R-valued logic with respect
to a suitable subclass of formulas. The proof is obtained by reducing finite strong
completeness to a problem in convex analysis, whose solution is provided by suitable
formulations of Farkas’ Lemma.
In Section 5 we extend the completeness theorem obtained in Section 4 to all formu-
las. At the end of Section 5 we also show that R-valued logic provides alternative
calculi for  Lukasiewicz logic and for continuous propositional logic.
Another weak formulation of completeness, namely the equivalence of consistency
and satisfiability, holds for  Lukasiewicz logic and for continuous propositional logic.
We refer to the equivalence of consistency and satisfiability as weak completeness.
Continuous propositional logic also satisfies a further weak version formulation of
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completeness, a so called approximated completeness (see [BYP10]). We show that
validity of corresponding results in R-valued logic is not granted without an addi-
tional hypothesis, as not every consistent set of assumptions extends to a maximal
consistent one.
In Section 6 we define the classes of unital and Archimedean theories. We show that
weak and approximated completeness (in the sense of continuous logic) both hold
for unital theories. Finally, among unital theories, we characterize Archimedean
theories as those for which strong completeness holds.
2 Formulas, structures and theories
In this section we begin the description ofR-valued logic. We remain rather informal,
in order not to bother a supposedly experienced reader with a number of minor
details.
We identify a language L with its extralogical symbols. So language L is a set
of symbols that we call proposition letters. The set of formulas is the least
set containing the proposition letters and closed under the connectives in the set
{0,+,∧} ∪Q, where 0 is a logical constant; rational numbers are unary connectives;
+,∧ are binary connectives.
Our choice of connectives is inspired by Riesz spaces (see [AB85]), in the same way
as the connectives of classical logic are inspired by Boolean algebras.
We also consider an extension of logical symbols obtained by adding the logical
constant 1. We shall refer to these two settings as the restricted and the extended
case respectively.
More explicitly, all proposition letters are formulas and, if ϕ and ψ are formulas,
then so are:
0. 0 and, in the extended case, 1;
1. ψ + ξ;
2. ψ ∧ ξ;
3. qϕ for every q ∈ Q.
Actually, we have been informal above as, for instance, braces will soon appear. We
write −ϕ for (−1)ϕ and ϕ−ψ for ϕ+(−ψ). We write ϕ∨ψ for −(−ϕ∧−ψ). We also
borrow some notation from Riesz spaces: ϕ+ and ϕ− stand for 0 ∨ ϕ and 0 ∨ (−ϕ)
respectively. We write ∣ϕ∣ for ϕ∨(−ϕ). In the extended case, we abbreviate q1 with
q, for all q ∈ Q.
A structure, or model, for a language L is a function M ∶ L→ R. In the extended
case we further require that M takes values in the interval [−1,1]. This semantic
requirement and its axiomatic counterpart (axiom a15 below) are motivated by the
consequences of Proposition 9 below.
Let M be a model. We recursively define ϕM for an arbitrary formula ϕ as follows:
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0. 0M = 0;
1. 1M = 1, in the extended case;
2. PM =M(P ), for all proposition letters P ;
3. (ψ + ξ)M = ψM + ξM ;
4. (ψ ∧ ξ)M =min{ψM , ξM};
5. (qψ)M = qψM .
We use the word inequality as a synonym for an ordered pair of formulas. In-
equalities are denoted by writing ϕ ≤ ψ. In order to simplify notation, we abbreviate
the inequality 0 ≤ ϕ with ϕ.
A theory is a binary relation on the set of formulas, namely a set of inequalities.
We elaborate on this definition of theory in Remark 10 below.
If M is a model and ϕM ≤ ψM we write M ⊧ ϕ ≤ ψ and we say that ϕ ≤ ψ holds in
M . If T is a theory, we define M ⊧ T and T ⊧ ϕ ≤ ψ in the usual way. We write
M ⊧ 0 < ϕ if 0 < ϕM . Finally, we write Th(M) for the set of inequalities that hold
in M .
We finish this section by commenting on our choice of logical connectives. The
presence of a unary connective for each element of Q is just a matter of convenience.
Alternative meaningful choices are {−1} or {−1
2
}. Together with addition, the former
singleton yields a connective for each element of Z. The latter yields a connective
for each element of the set D of dyadic rationals. With respect to both choices,
logical axioms for lattice modules replace those for vector lattices that occur in our
setting. Having in mind an extension to the predicate case, we opt for a complete
(in the sense of [BYU10]) set of connectives. In this regard, D and Q are equivalent
choices.
3 Logical axioms and derivations
The following inequalities, where ϕ, ψ and ξ range over all formulas, are called
logical axioms. We write ϕ = ψ to denote the theory {ϕ ≤ ψ,ψ ≤ ϕ}.
So an axiom expressing an equality (see below) actually stands for a pair of axioms.
We also write ϕ ≤ ξ ≤ ψ to denote the theory {ϕ ≤ ξ, ξ ≤ ψ}. The reader can make
sense by her-/him-self of some other minor notational abuses.
In the following, Q+ denotes the set of nonnegative rationals.
There are two axiom groups. The axioms from the first group are chosen having in
mind the theory of vector spaces over Q:
a1. ϕ +ψ = ψ + ϕ
a2. (ϕ + ψ) + ξ = ψ + (ϕ + ξ)
a3. ϕ + 0 = ϕ
a4. 1ϕ = ϕ
a5. 0ϕ = 0
a6. r ϕ + sϕ = (s + r)ϕ
a7. r ϕ + r ψ = r (ϕ + ψ)
a8. r (sϕ) = (rs)ϕ
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The axioms from the second group are inspired by the theory of Riesz spaces:
a9 ϕ ∧ϕ = ϕ
a10. ϕ ∧ ψ = ψ ∧ϕ
a11. (ϕ ∧ψ) ∧ ξ = ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ ξ)
a12. (ϕ + ξ) ∧ (ψ + ξ) = ϕ ∧ψ + ξ
a13. r(ϕ ∧ψ) = rϕ ∧ rψ for r ∈ Q+
a14. ϕ ∧ψ ≤ ψ
In the extended case, we add the following axioms for every proposition letter
P :
a15 −1 ≤ P ≤ 1.
There are three inference rules that are listed below. In the sequel we shall provide
some arguments in favour of their mutual independence and their non-replaceability
with logical axioms, even though we are not primarily concerned with these issues.
r1. ϕ ≤ ξ ≤ ψ ⊢ ϕ ≤ ψ; (Transitivity or modus ponens)
r2. ϕ ≤ ψ ⊢ rϕ + ξ ≤ rψ + ξ for r ∈ Q+; (Positive linearity)
r3. ϕ ≤ ψ ⊢ ϕ ∧ 0 ≤ ψ ∧ 0. (Restriction)
The notion of derivation is the standard one in Hilbert systems. As is customary,
we write T ⊢ ϕ ≤ ψ if there exists a derivation of ϕ ≤ ψ from T . We write ⊢mp for
derivability from r1 only and ⊢lin for derivability from rules r1 and r2 only.
The following proposition states some facts that we shall frequently use in the sequel.
The first fact states the invertibility of rule r1; the second one is a generalization of
r3.
1 Proposition The following hold for all formulas ϕ, ξ,ψ:
1. rϕ + ξ ≤ rψ + ξ ⊢lin ϕ ≤ ψ for every 0 < r ∈ Q;
2. ϕ ≤ ψ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ξ ≤ ψ ∧ ξ;
3. ξ ≤ ϕ, ξ ≤ ψ ⊢ ξ ≤ ϕ∧ψ;
4. ϕ ≤ ξ, ψ ≤ ξ ⊢ ϕ∨ψ ≤ ξ.
Proof. (Sketch)
1. Get r−1rϕ + ξ − ξ ≤ r−1rψ + ξ − ξ by r2. Another application of r2 to axioms,
together with r1, yields ϕ ≤ ψ.
2. Get ϕ − ξ ≤ ψ − ξ by r2 and (ϕ − ξ) ∧ 0 ≤ (ψ − ξ) ∧ 0 by r3. Add ξ on both sides
and apply a12.
3. Get ξ ∧ψ ≤ ϕ ∧ψ from ξ ≤ ϕ by 2 and ξ ≤ ξ ∧ ψ from ξ ≤ ψ, then apply r1.
4. Follows from 3, since ϕ ≤ ψ ⊢ −ψ ≤ −ϕ.
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2 Remark Notice that, for every theory T and every inequality ϕ ≤ ψ,
T ⊢ ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔ T ⊢ ψ − ϕ.
Implication ⇒ follows by application r2. The converse implication is a consequence
of 1, Proposition 1. The same equivalence holds for ⊢lin . We shall use these facts
without further mention in what follows (in particular in the formulation of the
soundness and completeness theorems).
The following is straightforward:
3 Soundness Theorem For every theory T and every formula ϕ, if T ⊢ ϕ then
T ⊧ ϕ.
We shall prove in the sequel that the converse implication holds for finite theories
and, under additional assumptions, for infinite theories as well.
A na¨ıve formulation of the classical deduction theorem for linear derivability would
be the following: if T,ϑ ⊢lin ψ then T ⊢lin ϑ ≤ ψ. Unfortunately this does not hold.
For it holds that 2Q ≤ P,Q ⊢lin P , but 2Q ≤ P /⊢lin Q ≤ P , by Theorem 3. The
same argument applies to ⊢ as well. The previous counterexample also appears in
[BYP10]. Nevertheless weaker formulations of the deduction theorem hold for both
deductive systems. Even if we are not going to establish a completeness theorem
with respect to ⊢lin , we deal first with it in order to make the reader acquainted with
the deductive system.
4 Linear Deduction Theorem The following are equivalent:
1. T, ϑ ⊢lin ϕ ≤ ψ;
2. T ⊢lin ϕ + rϑ ≤ ψ for some r ∈ Q+.
Proof. As 2⇒1 is trivial, we prove 1⇒2. We argue by induction on the length of a
derivation of ϕ ≤ ψ from T,ϑ. If the length is 1, then either ϕ ≤ ψ is in T or it is an
axiom, in which case we take r = 0, or ϕ ≤ ψ is syntactically equal to 0 ≤ ϑ, so the
conclusion follows by taking r = 1.
If the last rule applied in the derivation is r1 then T,ϑ ⊢lin ϕ ≤ ζ and T,ϑ ⊢lin ζ ≤ ψ,
for some formula ζ. By induction hypothesis, T ⊢lin ϕ + r1ϑ ≤ ζ and T ⊢lin ζ + r2ϑ ≤ ψ,
for some r1, r2 ∈ Q+. The conclusion follows by taking r = r1 + r2.
If the last rule applied in the derivation is r2 then there exist ϕ′, ψ′, ξ and s ∈ Q+ such
that ϕ and ψ are sϕ′ + ξ and sψ′ + ξ respectively and T,ϑ ⊢lin ϕ′ ≤ ψ′. By induction
hypothesis T ⊢lin ϕ
′ + tϑ ≤ ψ′, for some t ∈ Q+. So the conclusion follows by taking
r = st.
The proof of the Linear Deduction Theorem can be easily adapted to prove a similar
statement for ⊢mp in place of ⊢lin , also getting the stronger conclusion that r ∈N. We
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exploit this fact to argue that ⊢lin is indeed stronger than ⊢mp . Notice that 2P ⊢lin P .
On the other hand, if it were that 2P ⊢mp P then, by the Deduction Theorem for ⊢mp ,
we would get ⊢mp r2P ≤ P for some r ∈N. But the latter is not a valid derivation.
We justify the presence of rule r3 in a similar way. We notice that P /⊢lin P ∧ 0.
Otherwise, by the Linear Deduction Theorem, there would be r ∈ Q+ such that
⊢lin rP ≤ P ∧ 0. Then ⊧ rP ≤ P ∧ 0, which does not hold.
From the Linear Deduction Theorem we get the following:
5 Proposition The following are equivalent:
1. T ⊢lin ψ;
2. T, ϕ ⊢lin ψ and T,−ϕ ⊢lin ψ.
Proof. As 1⇒2 is trivial, we prove 2⇒1. From 2 and the Linear Deduction Theorem
we obtain
T ⊢lin rϕ ≤ ψ and T ⊢lin − sϕ ≤ ψ.
Assume r, s > 0, otherwise the conclusion is trivial. Then T ⊢lin (r−1 + s−1)ψ, from
which T ⊢lin ψ follows.
Notice that 2⇒1 above states the correctness of a sort of cut rule for ⊢lin . Below, in
Proposition 8, we prove a similar result for ⊢.
The following are basic identities valid in Riesz spaces (see e.g. [AB85]) that can
also be proved in R-valued logic. We include a proof sketch for convenience.
6 Proposition The following hold for all formulas ϕ,ψ:
1. ⊢ ϕ +ψ = ϕ ∧ψ +ϕ ∨ψ;
2. ⊢ ϕ = ϕ+ −ϕ−;
3. ⊢ ϕ+ ∧ ϕ− = 0;
4. ⊢ ∣ϕ∣ = ϕ+ +ϕ−.
Proof. (Sketch)
1. Get ⊢ ψ ≤ ϕ ∨ ψ by a14, then ⊢ ϕ + ψ − ϕ ∨ ψ ≤ ϕ by r2. Similarly, from
⊢ ϕ ≤ ϕ ∨ψ get ⊢ ϕ +ψ − ϕ ∨ψ ≤ ψ. The ≤ inequality in 1 now follows from 3 of
Proposition 1. The opposite inequality can be proved in a similar way, by a14
and 4 of Proposition 1.
2 Notice that ⊢ ϕ+ − ϕ− = ϕ ∨ 0 + ϕ ∧ 0 and apply 1.
3 From 2 and a12 we obtain ⊢ ϕ+ ∧ ϕ− = (ϕ+ − ϕ−) ∧ 0 +ϕ− = −ϕ− +ϕ−.
4 Follows from 2 and a12 as ⊢ ϕ ∨ (−ϕ) = 2(ϕ ∨ 0) − ϕ = 2ϕ+ −ϕ.
7 Deduction Theorem The following are equivalent:
1. T, ϑ ⊢ ϕ ≤ ψ;
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2. T ⊢ ϕ − rϑ− ≤ ψ for some r ∈ Q+.
Proof. By 4 of Proposition 1, we have ϑ ⊢ ϑ− = 0. So implication 2⇒1 is clear. To
prove 1⇒2, assume 1 and argue by induction on the length of a derivation of ϕ ≤ ψ
from T,ϑ. If the length is 1, then either ϕ ≤ ψ is in T or it is an axiom, in which
case the conclusion holds by taking r = 0, or ϕ ≤ ψ syntactically coincide with 0 ≤ ϑ
and all we need to prove is T ⊢ 0 − rϑ− ≤ ϑ for some r ∈ Q+. But this clearly holds
by taking r = 1 because T ⊢ ϑ = ϑ+ − ϑ−, by Proposition 6.
If the last applied rule in the derivation is either r1 or r2, then proceed as in the
proof of Theorem 4.
If the last applied rule is r3 then ϕ and ψ are of the form ϕ′∧0 and ψ′∧0 respectively,
for some ϕ′, ψ′ such that T,ϑ ⊢ ϕ′ ≤ ψ′. By induction hypothesis there exists r ∈ Q+
such that T ⊢ ϕ′−rϑ− ≤ ψ′. By applying rule r3 we obtain T ⊢ (ϕ′−rϑ−)∧0 ≤ ψ′∧0.
Now observe that ⊢ (ϕ′−rϑ−)∧(−rϑ−) ≤ (ϕ′−rϑ−)∧0 and that (ϕ′−rϑ−)∧(−rϑ−) =
(ϕ′ ∧ 0) − rϑ− is an instance of axiom a12. Then T ⊢ (ϕ′ ∧ 0) − rϑ− ≤ (ϕ′ − rϑ−) ∧ 0.
The conclusion thus follows.
Next we prove Proposition 5 for ⊢.
8 Proposition The following are equivalent:
1. T ⊢ ψ;
2. T, ϕ ⊢ ψ and T,−ϕ ⊢ ψ.
Proof. As 1⇒2 is trivial, we prove 2⇒1. Notice that ⊢ (−ϕ)− = ϕ+ so, assuming 2,
from the Deduction Theorem we get
T ⊢ −rϕ− ≤ ψ and T ⊢ −sϕ+ ≤ ψ
for some r, s ∈ Q+. Hence, by 3 of Proposition 1,
T ⊢ −(rϕ− ∧ sϕ+) ≤ ψ
The conclusion follows if we show that ⊢ rϕ+ ∧ sϕ− = 0. This is clear if 0 ≤ r, s ≤ 1,
in fact ⊢ 0 ≤ rϕ+ ∧ sϕ− ≤ ϕ+ ∧ ϕ− = 0. The general case follows by using axioms a13
and a8.
So far all the results apply to the restricted case and to the extended one. This is
not the case with the next result.
9 Proposition In the extended case, for every formula ϕ there is some integer n such
that ⊢ −n ≤ ϕ ≤ n.
Proof. Follows from a15 by straightforward induction on formulas.
9
A consequence of the proposition above is that −1 ⊢lin ϕ for every formula ϕ. Notice
that there is no formula that plays the role of a contradiction in the restricted case.
10 Remark In this remark, which is not relevant for the further technical develop-
ments, we motivate our definition of theory.
In the theory of Boolean algebras, there is a well-known correspondence between
homomorphisms and filters (equivalently: ideals). We recall that a similar corre-
spondence holds for Riesz spaces. If f ∶ E → L is a homomorphism of Riesz spaces,
then F = f−1[0] is a so called solid subspace of E and f factors through the quotient
epimorphism pi ∶ E → E/F , where E/F is the quotient Riesz space of E with respect
to F . More precisely, there exists a unique Riesz space monomorphism ι ∶ E/F → L
such that f = ι ○ pi. See [Fre74, §14G] for details.
It is also well-known that the quotient of the set of formulas of classical propositional
logic with respect to the relation of provable equivalence is a Boolean algebra and
that deductively closed set of formulas become filters in such algebra (the improper
filter corresponding to any inconsistent set).
Also, in R-valued logic, it can be easily verified that the quotient R/∼ of the set R
of formulas of any fixed language with respect to the equivalence relation defined
by ϕ ∼ ψ ⇔ ⊢ ϕ = ψ is a Riesz space, when equipped with the induced operations.
So, in order to carry on with the similarities, one should define a theory in R-valued
logic as a set T of formulas such that T /∼ is a solid subspace. Actually, our definition
of theory as a set of inequalities is essentially equivalent to the above. For it is easy
to verify that, if T is a theory in our sense, then the set {(ϕ∼, ψ∼) ∶ T ⊢ ϕ ≤ ψ} is a
preorder on R/∼ which
1. extends the ordering on R/∼;
2. is compatible with the Riesz space structure (in the sense expressed by deduction
rules r1÷ r3 above).
Moreover, if we replace R/∼ with an arbitrary Riesz space E and ⊑ is a preorder
on E which satisfies 1 and 2 above, then the set F = {v ∈ E ∶ 0 ⊑ v ⊑ 0} is a solid
subspace. Vice versa, if F is a solid subspace of E, by letting v ⊑ w ⇔ v ≤ w + c
for some c ∈ F, we obtain a preorder that satisfies 1 and 2.
To sum up: the definition of theory is just a matter of taste. For us, a theory
is essentially a partial ordering on the set of formulas, which can be interpreted by
saying that some formula is always truer than some other formula, without reference
to a notion of absolute truth. On the contrary, in the alternative setting presented
above, the logical constant 0 represents absolute truth, just as in Continuous Logic,
and a theory contains all the “absolutely true” formulas.
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4 Linear formulas
We say that formula ϕ is linear combination of formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn if it is of the
form
Restricted case:
n
∑
i=1
aiϕi Extended case:
n
∑
i=1
aiϕi + a
for some a1, . . . , an, a ∈ Q, with the convention that, if n = 0, the two summations
stand for 0 and a respectively. When a1, . . . , an, a ∈ Q+ we say that ϕ is a positive
linear combination. We say that ϕ is a linear formula if it is a linear combination
of pairwise distinct proposition letters. We call the corresponding tuple (a1, . . . , an)
the vector associated to ϕ and a the affine component of ϕ.
Notice that each formula free from the connective ∧ is ⊢lin -equivalent to an essentially
unique linear formula, which, with slight abuse, we may call its normal form. In the
sequel we shall always assume that linear formulas are in normal form.
For the reader’s convenience, we provide an affine version of Farkas’ Lemma that is
suitable for purposes, in the sense that it is formulated with respect to the field of
rationals. See the comment at the beginning of [Sch00, Ch. 7] about its validity in
the setting of rationals. See [Sch00, Corollary 7.1h] for a proof.
11 Farkas’ Lemma Let v1, . . . , vn, u ∈ Qk and let r1, . . . , rn, s ∈ Q. Let S = {x ∈
Qk ∶ 0 ≤ vi ⋅ x + ri for i = 1, . . . , n} be non-empty. Then the following are equiva-
lent:
1. 0 ≤ u ⋅ x + s for all x ∈ S;
2. there exist q1, . . . , qn ∈ Q+ such that u =
n
∑
i=1
qivi and
n
∑
i=1
qiri ≤ s.
We also recall the following related result (see, for instance, [Bar07, Lemma 4.2] or
[Tao08, Lemma 2.54]).
12 Lemma Let S be as in Lemma 11. If S is empty then there exist q1, . . . , qn ∈ Q+
such that 0 = ∑ qivi and ∑ qiri < 0.
13 Finite Strong Completeness Theorem for Linear Formulas Let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn
and ψ be linear formulas. Then the following are equivalent:
1. ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢lin ψ;
2. ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢ ψ;
3. ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊧ ψ;
4. In the restricted case, ψ is a positive linear combination of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn. In the
extended case, ψ or −1 are positive linear combinations of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn.
Proof. Implication 4⇒1 holds in both cases, under the assumption that ψ is a posi-
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tive linear combination of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn. It suffices to notice that, for all formulas ξ, ζ
and all r ∈ Q+, ζ ⊢ rζ and that ζ ⊢ ξ ≤ ξ+ζ (both by rule r2). Hence ξ, ξ ≤ ξ+ζ ⊢ ξ+ζ,
by rule r1. Therefore ξ, ζ ⊢ ξ+ ζ. In the extended case, if −1 is a positive linear com-
bination of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, then ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢lin −1 and, by the remark after Proposition 9,
we get ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢lin ψ.
Implication 1⇒2 is trivial and 2⇒3 holds by soundness. Only 3⇒4 is left to prove.
Let P1, . . . , Pk be the proposition letters that occur in the formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ.
Let v1, . . . , vn, u ∈ Qk be the vectors associated to ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ and let r1, . . . , rn, s
be their affine components (in the restricted case assume these to be 0).
In order to simultaneously deal with both cases, in the extended case, without loss of
generality we assume that the inequalities −1 ≤ Pi ≤ 1, for i = 1, . . . , k, occur among
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn. So 3 implies that
5. for all x ∈ Qk if 0 ≤ vi ⋅ x + ri for all i = 1, . . . , n then 0 ≤ u ⋅ x + s.
Let S be as in Lemma 11. Assume assume first that S is non-empty (which is
certainly true in the restricted case). By Lemma 11 we get q1, . . . , qn, r ∈ Q+ such
that
q1v1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + qnvn = u and q1r1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + qnrn + r = s.
It thus follows that ψ is a positive linear combination of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn.
Eventually, we consider the case when S is empty. By Lemma 12, there exist
q1, . . . , qn ∈ Q+ such that ⊢lin q1ϕ1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + qnϕn = −1, as claimed in 4.
5 Finite strong completeness
Before proving a strong completeness theorem for finite theories, we need a prelim-
inary result.
Let ϕ¯ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) be a tuple of formulas and let ε = (ε1, . . . , εn) ∈ {−1,1}n. We
write εϕ¯ for the tuple ε1ϕ1, . . . , εnϕn.
14 Lemma For every formula ψ there exist a natural number nψ and a tuple ψ¯ of
linear formulas of length nψ with the property that, for each ε ∈ {−1,1}nψ there
exists a linear formula ψε for which
1. εψ¯ ⊢ ψ = ψε
Proof. By induction on ψ. The only non-trivial case is when ψ is of the form ϕ ∧ ξ.
Let us inductively assume the statement true for ϕ and ξ. Then, for all ε ∈ {−1,1}nϕ
and all δ ∈ {−1,1}nξ ,
2. εϕ¯, δξ¯, ϕε − ξδ ⊢ ψ = ξδ
3. εϕ¯, δξ¯,−ϕε + ξδ ⊢ ψ = ϕε
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Let ψ¯ be the concatenation of ϕ¯, ξ¯ and (ϕε − ξδ)εδ. where the tuples εδ are lexico-
graphically ordered. We denote by p(εδ) the position of εδ in such ordering.
Let nψ = nϕ+nξ+2nϕ+nξ . Notice that every σ ∈ {−1,1}nψ can be uniquely written as
a concatenation εδρ, for some ε ∈ {−1,1}nϕ , δ ∈ {−1,1}nξ and ρ ∈ {−1,1}2
nϕ+nξ
. For
each such σ we let ψσ = ξδ if the p(εδ)-th coordinate of ρ is 1 and ψσ = ϕε if the p(εδ)-
th coordinate of ρ is −1. It is now straightforward to check that σψ¯ ⊢ ψ = ψσ.
15 Proposition Let ϕ be a formula. Then the following are equivalent:
1. ⊢ ϕ;
2. ⊧ ϕ.
Proof. Direction 1⇒2 is soundness. We prove 2⇒1. Let nϕ, ϕ¯ and ϕε, for ε ∈
{−1,1}nϕ , be as in the statement of Lemma 14. Then
3. εϕ¯ ⊢ ϕ = ϕε.
By soundness we also have εϕ¯ ⊧ ϕ = ϕε. So, assuming ⊧ ϕ, we obtain that εϕ¯ ⊧
ϕε for every ε ∈ {−1,1}n. From the finite strong completeness theorem for linear
formulas, Theorem 13, we get εϕ¯ ⊢lin ϕε. Hence εϕ¯ ⊢ ϕ follows from 3. Finally, we
obtain 1 by repeatedly applying Proposition 8.
16 Finite Strong Completeness Theorem Let ϕ be a formula and let T be a finite
theory. Then the following are equivalent:
1. T ⊢ ϕ;
2. T ⊧ ϕ.
For infinite T the previous corollary may fail. Consider the theory T = {0 ≤ rQ ≤ P ∶
r ∈ Q+} in the language L = {P,Q}. Then T ⊧ −Q but T ⊢/ −Q, otherwise we would
have T0 ⊢ −Q for some finite T0 ⊆ T . But T0 ⊧/ −Q for any finite T0 ⊆ T . We shall
elaborate on this in the next section.
17 Remark With reference to the restricted case, let us generalize the definition of
structure given in Section 2. For R a Riesz space, a R-structure is a function
M ∶ L → R. Truth in a R-structure is defined in the natural way and it is easy to
verify that the corresponding semantics is sound for R-valued logic. Let us write ⊧R
for the relation of logical consequence with respect to the class of all R-structures
as R ranges over all Riesz spaces. Then, for all formulas ϕ and all finite theories T ,
the following are equivalent:
1. T ⊢ ϕ;
2. T ⊧R ϕ;
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3. T ⊧ ϕ.
By Theorem 16, it suffices to show that 1 ⇒ 2. This implication is straightforward
because Theorem 3 easily extends to ⊧R .
Notice that the equivalences above yield the analogue of [MOG04, Theorem 2.12]
for Riesz spaces.
18 Remark If we work with a countable language L then R-valued logic is decidable.
Actually, the set {ϕ ∶ ⊢ ϕ} is clearly recursively enumerable. Moreover, by the Com-
pleteness Theorem above we have that /⊢ ϕ if and only if there is some structure
M such that ϕM < 0. The latter holds if and only ϕM < 0 for some M ∶ L → Q.
Let P1, . . . , Pn be the proposition letters occurring in ϕ. Any effective enumeration
of Qn induces an enumeration (Mk)k∈N of all rational valued assignments of val-
ues to P1, . . . , Pn. The procedure that, at step k, computes ϕ
Mk yields recursive
enumerability of {ϕ ∶ /⊢ ϕ}.
19 Remark Extended R-valued logic faithfully interprets  Lukasiewicz logic. In order
to see that, recall that the connectives ∸, ¬ form a complete set of connectives for
 Lukasiewicz logic and notice that they are definable in the extended logic. Moreover,
the models of  Lukasiewicz logic form an axiomatizable subclass of those of extended
R-valued logic, as simply one has to impose the condition 0 ≤ P on every proposition
letter P . From Theorem 16 we get that, for every formula ϕ(P1, . . . , Pn) in the
language of  Lukasiewicz logic, whose proposition letters are among those displayed,
⊢ L ϕ(P1, . . . , Pn) ⇔ P1, . . . , Pn ⊢ ϕ(P1, . . . , Pn) = 1,
where ⊢ L and ⊢ stand for provability in  Lukasiewicz and in the extended R-valued
logic respectively.
Similar considerations apply to continuous propositional logic, recalling that {∸,¬, 1
2
}
is a complete set of connectives for such logic.
6 Archimedean theories
As usual, we say that a theory T is satisfiable if there exists a structure M such
that M ⊧ T . In the restricted case satisfiability property is trivial, as every theory
is satisfiable in the constant model 0. Hence, in the restricted case, we are actually
interested in satisfiability other than in the constant model 0.
We say that T is consistent if T ⊢/ ϕ for some formula ϕ.
We say that T is total if it is consistent and, for every formula ϕ, T ⊢ ϕ or T ⊢ −ϕ,
possibly both. In other words T is total if its deductive closure is a non-trivial total
preorder on the set of formulas. The reader may verify that T is total if and only if
it is prime, namely if and only if it satisfies the property that whenever T ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
then T ⊢ ϕ or T ⊢ ψ.
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20 Proposition Every consistent theory extends to a total theory.
Proof. Let ξ be a formula such that such that T ⊢/ ξ. Then T extends to a theory
T ′ that is maximal with respect to the property that T ′ ⊢/ ξ. Proposition 8 implies
that T ′ is total.
We say that T is unital if there is a formula ξ such that, for every ϕ, there is some
r ∈ Q+ such that T ⊢ ϕ ≤ rξ. Such a formula ξ is called a unit in T . In the extended
case, constant 1 is a unit in all theories, as a consequence of Proposition 9.
Notice that if ξ is a unit in T , then ξ is a unit in every extension of T .
21 Remark It is straightforward to check that, if ξ is a unit in T , then T is consistent
if and only if T ⊢/ − ξ. Moreover, if T is maximal with respect to the latter property,
then T is maximal consistent. Therefore unital consistent theories extend to maximal
consistent theories. We shall see this is not true in general.
22 Remark Let T be a theory and let ϕ be a formula such that T ⊢/ ϕ. Then, by
Proposition 8, T,−ϕ is consistent. We shall repeatedly use this this fact in the
sequel without further mention.
By the previous remark, every maximal consistent theory is total. In the extended
case, Th(M) is trivially total for every model M . The same holds in the restricted
case, when M is not the constant model 0. By Proposition 24 below, Th(M) is also
maximal consistent.
We write T + for the set of formulas ϕ such that T ⊢ ϕ and T − for the set of formulas
ϕ such that T ⊢ −ϕ. If T + = T − we say that T is trivial. So, if T is non-trivial
then T + ∖ T − is non-empty. Non-trivial theories are consistent: just notice that if
ξ ∈ T +∖T − then T ⊢/ −ξ. The converse is not true in general, the empty theory being
a counter-example. Complete theories are easily seen to be non-trivial. Consistent
unital theories are non-trivial as well.
We write Q+ϕ for the set {rϕ ∶ r ∈ Q+}.
23 Proposition Let T be a consistent theory and let ϕ,ψ be such that T ⊢ Q+ϕ ≤ ψ.
Then T,−ϕ is consistent.
Proof. If T,−ϕ is inconsistent then T,−ϕ ⊢ −ψ. By assumption and by the Deduction
Theorem, we get T ⊢ Q+ϕ ≤ rϕ+, for some r ∈ Q+. From inconsistency of T,−ϕ we
also get T ⊢ ϕ hence T ⊢ ϕ = ϕ+. Therefore T ⊢ −ϕ, contradicting the consistency
of T .
We say that T is Archimedean if for every ϕ,ψ such that T ⊢ Q+ϕ ≤ ψ then
T ⊢ −ϕ. Clearly Th(M) is Archimedean for every structure M . It follows from
Theorem 16 that every finite theory is Archimedean.
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24 Proposition For every theory T , the following are equivalent:
1. T is maximal consistent;
2. T is closed under deduction, total and Archimedean;
3. T is closed under deduction, total and every ξ ∈ T + ∖ T − is a unit in T .
Proof. Implication 1⇒2 is straightforward. As for 2⇒3, assume 2 and, for sake of
contradiction, let ξ ∈ T + ∖ T − which is not a unit. Then there is a formula ϕ such
that T ⊢/ ϕ ≤ rξ for any r ∈ Q+. Being total, T ⊢ rξ ≤ ϕ for all r ∈ Q+. Hence, by the
Archimedean property, T ⊢ −ξ, a contradiction.
As for 3⇒1, assume 3 and let ξ ∉ T . Completeness and closure under deduction yield
that −ξ ∈ T . Hence, by assumption, −ξ is a unit in T . Therefore for every ϕ there
exists r ∈ Q+ such that T ⊢ rξ ≤ −ϕ. So T, ξ is inconsistent.
25 Example There is a total theory T that has no maximal consistent extension. In
particular, T is non-Archimedean, non-unital, and has only the constant model 0.
We construct such a theory T by using the generalized notion of structure introduced
in Remark 17. We are going to define a Q[x]-valued structure M . Recall that Q[x]
has an ordered ring structure with respect to the order induced by r < x, for all
r ∈ Q. For each i ∈ ω, the language of M contains a proposition letter Pi which is
interpreted as the monomial xi. Let T be the set of inequalities that hold in M .
As the generalized semantics is sound, the theory T is consistent and deductively
closed. As the ordering on Q[x] is a linear, T is total. Moreover T ⊢ 0 ≤ Q+Pi ≤ Pi+1
for all i so, if S is any Archimedean extension of T , then S ⊧ Pi = 0. It follows
that S is inconsistent. We have just shown that T has no consistent Archimedean
extension, so it has only the constant model 0.
A comment on the generalized semantics above: just notice that every inequality
(in our sense) can be regarded as an inequality in the language of Riesz spaces
(metavariables for formulas becoming variables for vectors). Keeping this in mind,
the axioms of R-valued logic are true in every Riesz space and its deduction rules
can be regarded as valid deduction rules in the Riesz space setting. So, if N is any
Riesz space and V ⊆ N is a set of linearly independent vectors, any set T of weak
inequalities satisfied in N by linear combinations of elements of V ∪{0} can be viewed
as a consistent theory in our sense, simply by regarding each v ∈ V as a proposition
letter. In particular, when N is linearly ordered, the set T of all inequalities satisfied
in N by linear combinations of elements of V ∪ {0}, we get a total theory.
26 Weak Completeness Theorem for Unital Theories Let T be a unital theory
and let ξ be a unit in T . In the extended case further assume that ξ is 1. Then the
following are equivalent:
1. T is consistent;
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2. there exists a structure M such that M ⊧ T and ξM = 1.
Proof. Implication 2⇒1 follows immediately from soundness. To prove 1⇒2, let S be
a maximal consistent extension of T (see Remark 21). Notice that, by Proposition 24,
S is total and Archimedean. If ζ is a formula, we let
Sζ = {r ∈ Q ∶ S ⊢ ζ ≤ rξ} and Sζ = {r ∈ Q ∶ S ⊢ rξ ≤ ζ}.
Totality and Archimedean property of S imply that, for every formula ζ,
1. ∅ ≠ Sζ ≤ Sζ ≠ ∅;
2. Sζ is bounded from below;
3. inf Sζ = supSζ .
We define a structure M as follows: for every proposition letter P we let
4. PM = inf SP = supSP .
Recall that 0M = 0 and, in the extended case, 1M = 1. Notice that, by consistency of
S, the equalities in 3 hold even when P is replaced by 0 and, in the extended case,
also by constant 1. We prove by induction that 4 extends to all formulas.
Let ζ be of the form ϕ+ψ. Let us inductively assume that ϕM = inf Sϕ = supSϕ and
ψM = inf Sψ = supSψ. Notice that Sϕ + Sψ ⊆ Sϕ+ψ and that Sϕ + Sψ ⊆ Sϕ+ψ. Then
ϕM + ψM = supSϕ + supSψ = sup(Sϕ + Sψ)
≤ supSϕ+ψ = inf Sϕ+ψ
≤ inf(Sϕ + Sψ) = inf Sϕ + inf Sψ = ϕM +ψM .
As ζM = ϕM + ψM , we are done.
Next, let ζ be of the form ϕ ∧ ψ. Notice that Sϕ, Sψ ⊆ Sϕ∧ψ. Without loss of
generality, assume ϕM ≤ ψM . Under the same inductive assumptions as in the
previous case, we get ϕM = inf Sϕ ≥ inf Sϕ∧ψ. We claim that the previous inequality
cannot be strict. For sake of contradiction, suppose it is and let r, s ∈ Q be such
that inf Sϕ∧ψ < r < s < inf Sϕ. By totality of S and by ϕM ≤ ψM we get S ⊢ sξ ≤ ϕ
and S ⊢ sξ ≤ ψ. Hence, by 3 of Proposition 1, S ⊢ sξ ≤ ϕ ∧ ψ. On the other hand,
S ⊢ ϕ∧ψ ≤ rξ. It follows that S ⊢ (r− s)ξ, contradicting consistency of S. Therefore
(ϕ ∧ψ)M = inf Sϕ = inf Sϕ∧ψ = supSϕ∧ψ.
The case when ζ is of the form qϕ is straightforward.
Finally, it is easy to check that M ⊧ S and ξM = 1.
Among unital theories, Archimedean theories are those for which a strong complete-
ness theorem holds.
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27 Completeness Theorem for Archimedean Unital Theories Let T be a con-
sistent unital theory. Then the following are equivalent:
1. T is Archimedean;
2. for every formula ϕ, if T ⊧ ϕ then T ⊢ ϕ.
Moreover 2⇒1 also holds for non-unital theories.
Proof. To prove 2⇒1, assume 2 and suppose that T ⊢ Q+ϕ ≤ ψ and T ⊢/ − ϕ, for
some ϕ,ψ. By 2, there exists M ⊧ T such that ϕM > 0, which immediately yields a
contradiction.
To prove 1⇒2, suppose that T is Archimedean. Let ϕ be such that T ⊢/ −ϕ and let
ξ be a unit in T . In the extended case further assume that ξ is 1. Let r ∈ Q+ be
such that T ⊢/ rϕ ≤ ξ. Then T, ξ ≤ rϕ is unital and consistent. By Theorem 26 there
exists M ⊧ T, ξ ≤ rϕ such that ξM = 1. From M ⊧ r−1ξ ≤ ϕ we get T /⊧ −ϕ.
An approximated completeness theorem, similar to that proved in [BY08] for con-
tinuous logic, holds for unital theories. It is an immediate corollary of Theorem 26.
28 Approximated Completeness Theorem for unital theories Let T be a con-
sistent unital theory. Then the following are equivalent for every unit ξ:
1. T ⊢ ϕ + rξ for all 0 < r ∈ Q;
2. T ⊧ ϕ.
Proof. Implication 1⇒2 follows from soundness. To prove 2⇒1, let ξ be a unit in T .
In the extended case further assume that ξ is 1. Assume that T ⊢/ ϕ + rξ, for some
0 < r ∈ Q. Hence T,−(ϕ + rξ) is consistent and unital. By Theorem 26, there exists
M ⊧ T such that M ⊧ ϕ + rξ ≤ 0 and ξM = 1. Such M witnesses T ⊧/ ϕ.
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